The boycott of the GPA ferries continues

The Senegalese Transport Union's boycott of the Gambia Ports Authority (GPA) ferry services continues unabated.  The meeting held this week between the union and Gambia government officials ended in a stalemate.  Meanwhile, the intransigence continues with no end in sight.

It must be noted that the borders between The Gambia and Senegal have not been closed.  It is only the President of the Republic of Senegal who has the power to close his side of the border, and no anyone else, including the Transport Union. Senegalese commercial vehicles are bound by union rules to observe the boycott but non-commercial and private vehicles are unaffected by union action.

The Senegalese union is a typical "bread and butter" organization that protects the economic well being of its members, and promotes their general welfare.  It is independent of the Senegalese government - an independence they guard jealously against government and third party interference.  The ferocious nature of the union's defense of their independence against government interference is shared by unions across francophone Africa, something inherited from their colonial heritage.  Unless the national security of Senegal is threatened, the union will not accommodate any attempt by the government of Senegal to interfere in the boycott.  It is the State that will determine when the national security line has been crossed, at which time all concerns will act in unison.

Unlike The Gambia, Senegal is a democracy that values the separation of powers, and the independence of unions to engage in legitimate activities on behalf of its members.  The unions are boycotting the ferry services because Yaya Jammeh changed the rules by requiring the payment of foreign currency.  The mandatory nature of the decision is what caused the boycott.   Although the payment in CFA had been optional, it had always been a currency of choice by both the Gambia and Senegal since the inception of the GPA in 1972, but for different reasons.  For the Gambia, the CFA it is a source of foreign exchange, and for the Senegalese, it is convenient because it is their national currency, and since it was optional, they preferred it to going to a forex bureau to change to local currency.  Revenue collected by GPA, especially the CFA component has always been accessed by Jammeh since he seized power in 1994 for use outside the normal operations of the GPA which has contributed to it's current insolvency.

Even when the dalasi was losing value against the CFA, the GPA under the Jawara regime never changed the rules which was a smart move.  To change the rules automatically removes the option that the Senegalese drivers enjoyed all these years - a change which sparked the current controversy leading to the boycott. The rapid loss of value of the dalasi is the obvious trigger, a decision that is costing the Gambian economy in decline in revenue for GPA and other commercial activities around the crossings at Farafenni and Barra, in particular.

Resumption of negotiations over the boycott between the Senegalese Union and the government of Yaya Jammeh is uncertain at this point.  Meanwhile, the economies of both countries suffer, however disproportionately, and in our view, unnecessarily.    

Groundnut buying season : Good news, bad news

It is rather early in the groundnut (peanut, to my American audience) buying season that started last month in a avalanche of confusion, to hail it a success or declare it a failure.  The confusion started with the announcement of the producer price that the farmer was being offered and the declaration of the season open on the 3rd of December by the Agribusiness Services and Producers Association (ASPA) only to be told by the Gambian dictator that they've been fired with immediate effect.  Agents of the ASPA were no longer empowered to buy the produce.

Instead, the Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GGC) will now be responsible not only for processing and exporting Gambia's primary foreign exchange earner, they will now be responsible for buying and transporting the crop to transit points and beyond, completing the vertical integration of the GGC by the single stroke of the dictator's pen without considering the implication of such action.  For a corporation whose financial viability is questionable at best, with limited managerial capacity, according GGC monopoly status is ill-advised.  Signs are already there, but time will tell as they say.

These limitations notwithstanding, the season started with the projection that GGC will buy 40,000 tons. Although it is too early to tell from our vantage point, it appears, as we have said in previous blogs, it will be a steep hill to climb because of the monopoly status of the GGC which, by definition, bars private buyers from participating.  Limiting the players, suppresses competition which, in turn, freezes the price that the farmer gets at the official price.  Private buyers, last year, offered the farmer higher price which forced other buyers to up their price.  For example, last year when the producer producer price was D 10,500 per ton, Chinese buyers were offering Gambian farmers D 19,000 per ton. Needless to say that higher price ultimately benefits not only the individual farmer but the rural farming and business communities. Unfortunately, this year, the Gambian dictator saw to it that private buyers have been banned from the market.

Brisk buying has been noticed in seccos (buying points) in Ballanghar, Lower Saloum partly because Senegalese are crossing the border to sell there nuts there.  This is a good sign because it means that there was little or no credit buying in this area, at least for now.  It is also possible that the price on offer in The Gambia, despite the lack of competition from private buyers, is higher than what's on offer across the border.

Illiassa is also reporting brisk buying, and as at this week, there was no credit buying.  However, other seccos in Farafenni are reporting some credit buying.  farmers are being asked to come back a day or two for their money.  Seccos have been running out of money to pay for the crop.  We hope this is a localized phenomenon and a temporary hiccup rather than a generalized one.  We will know as the season progresses whether credit buying has taken places, and if so, the extent of it and its impact on the tonnage purchased.

When we posed the question of credit to local farmers and businessmen in the Farafenni area, the responds was that it depends on the "demand for money".  If the traffic is high, the buying agent usually runs out of cash, but as long as the waiting period is a day or two, farmers don't mind the wait.  There's an air of apprehension in certain quarters about the ability of the GGC to continue paying for the produce they buy from farmers.  After all, government still owes some farmers huge sums of money from previous seasons which are still outstanding.

Some farmers are unhappy with the allowance for the weight of the bags that is deducted from the total weight of their produce at the weigh stations.  It ranges from 1kg - 1.5kg from secco to secco.  As one farmer opined, "a kilogram here, and a kilo gram there, add up to something big for someone in Banjul." We could not agree more with the sentiment of this farmer.

The final bad news is that in the Farafenni area, the volume is high but the nuts are small and underdeveloped which means the export volume premium HPS (hand picked selected) that brings in higher premium export price will not be as high as hoped.  This problem points to the quality of seed nuts available to farmers for planting. The regime has done an extremely poor job of multiplying high quality seeds, and making them available to farmers.  Other farm inputs like fertilizer and agricultural credit have been in short supply. Building a strong agricultural extension services to support the farming community has also been an abysmal failure, and agricultural research budget slashed in favor of funding celebrations and cultural festivities.  For the regime of Yaya Jammeh, pomp and pageantry trumps over the livelihood of the ordinary farmer, every time.

This is a first in a series of reports on the farming season which we will continue to monitor.

Is Raleigh dead ?

No, not Raleigh the city, but Raleigh the political process that was sold to the political parties and activists alike, as the vehicle capable of bringing the opposing parties in a unified coalition against the dictatorship in The Gambia.

When the Dakar venue for the meeting failed to materialize, the good folks of Raleigh, Atlanta and Washington graciously stepped in to save the day by suggesting Raleigh as the alternative venue. Gambians from all corners rallied around the organizers to stage, what was billed as the most important meeting of opposition ever.

Despite initial reluctance in some quarters to support the idea, the meeting was convened and leaders of all major political party, with the notable exception of one, attended Raleigh.  Interspersed with the political party leaders were keys players in the Gambian political scene and leaders of civic and activists organization.

The two-day meeting culminated in a Communique, signed by all parties, which set out to construct a structure named the Steering Committee, and to provide a framework within which the political parties are expected "to pursue an Agenda for Democratic Change in The Gambia."  Besides the coordinating function which runs throughout the Committee's terms of reference, its main task is "the effective crafting and representation of the Agenda for Change." There's the resource mobilization function of the Steering Committee which can only be successful if the main task of crafting an Agenda for Change must first be successful for the stakeholders and potential donors to buy into the enterprise.  Thus, getting the Agenda right is a necessary prerequisite, in our view, for the rest to fall into place.

Extensive discussion took place during, but principally, after Raleigh, regarding the size of the Steering Committee.  In their desire to be inclusive by ensuring that all geographical areas where Gambian exiles reside are represented, organizers extended membership to 27 individuals.  The size became a topic of discussion, and so was the composition.  It is unclear where the Committee stands on both issues as at now. A Steering Committee of 27 members spanning three continents, even with modern communication technology, was considered unwieldy which may hinder the work of the Committee in building consensus around contentious issues, especially in drafting an important and complex a document as an Agenda for Change that all parties involved can support and rally around.

The Chairman of the Committee has yet to be named.  An announcement of his imminent selection proved to be premature.  Leadership is of utmost importance which should have been resolved by the party leaders and representatives of civic and activists groups.  In fact, the size and composition of the Steering Committee should have also been resolved before they departed Raleigh.   As a result of these omissions, delays in the process are almost inevitable which may dampen interest and enthusiasm.

It's been eight months since Raleigh, and yet we are unclear as to where we are for lack of information.  A one-pager from either the organizers or the members of the Steering Committee will help allay worries that Raleigh is on its death dead which would be a shame after all the effort and hard work that went into making it happen.

Is the UTG a ticking time bomb?

The University of The Gambia is an effective propaganda tool for the Jammeh regime and a convenient talking point for A(F)PRC supporters. As it is a propaganda tool, so it is also a ticking time bomb, ready to go off because it is producing 'graduates' at a rate that the economy cannot absorb.

The Gambian economy is not growing fast enough to absorb 50 - 100 graduates annually. Don't tell me the civil service will provide them with employment, because it cannot. The private sector, on the other hand, is contracting instead, and many enterprises closing their doors. Yet, UTG continues to churn them out at blazing speed with total disregard for quality.

The bomb will go off earlier than projected for an institution that is barely 2 decades old. I hate to say this but 'we told you so'.

The above is a Facebook post, prompted by a Voice of America report about youth unemployment in Africa despite advances in higher education.  The explosive ranks of the unemployed young Africans is threatening the social fabric and stability of governments.  International Labor Organization say that in Africa, the youth are twice as likely to be unemployed as adults, despite the fact that the young are better educated than previous cohorts.

African governments must address the problem urgently or else they will face a rising tide of unrest all across the continent.

We intend to take an in debt look at the problem with special reference to The Gambia. 

The VOA piece is here: http://ecowas.einnews.com/article/187680022/Q6hb8zVporGnIzHU?n=2&code=dwDJlQ8rdkHXLBBs

The Gambia 1994 - 2014 : 20 years of pure unadultrated hell

How Dr Jamus Jammeh looked in July 1994

Tobacco Road, Banjul compounds

The A(F)PRC regime of Alhaji Dr. Professor Yaya Jamus Junkung Jammeh is preparing to 'celebrate' what, members consider to be 20 years of progress.  The celebration is planned to coincide with the fifth Party Congress.  It is in this regard that a team of party stalwarts, led by the Leader of the National Assembly, is touring the country to sensitize and gin up support from a demoralized populace that has suddenly awoken to the stark realities of 20 years of misrule, incompetence and high level of corruption never before seen in the post-Independent history of The Gambia.  The team comprising of Assemblymen, Mayors and other party officials dubbed the "Taskforce Committee".

During the first meeting of the Committee, The Assembly Leader touted the record of the A(F)PRC and the first gem he pulled out of their success bag was the University of The Gambia (UTG), and the fact that the current Secretary General of both the Civil Service and the ruling APRC, an oxymoron, is a product of the UTG.  It is as misleading as it is frequent a claim by a desperate regime in search of success stories to justify its twenty years of failure.  To correct the record, I posted on my Facebook page a litany of the constituent institutions that make up the UTG - Brikama College Campus, Management Development Institute, the Gambia Technical Training Institute, The School of Nursing, The School of Public Health, The Rural Development Institute, National Agricultural Research Institute, all 5 of the Regional Education Resource Centers.

All these structures were built by the government under Sir Dawda Jawara, without which, there will be no University. Most importantly, the academic mission and content were formulated well before some of these structures were completed with the St Marys University link.  Pulling all of these together form the UTG.  To claim, therefore, that UTG was established singly by the Jammeh regime is not accurate.  The foundation and most of the content were in place a decade before these irresponsible and rogue soldiers entered the scene.

The Committees next destination was Basse where the A(F)PRC is losing political support from all age groups, particularly the youth who were promised free and quality education.  Access was also promised with some degree of success.  However, on all other aspects, this regime has failed to deliver in spectacular fashion.  The quality of primary and secondary education have deteriorated at alarming rates as suggested by the poor results posted by Gambian students in the West African school leaving certificate exams as well as entrance exams to secondary schools.

Under Jawara, the emphasis was on the 'software' aspect of education under the First 15-Year Education Policy 1988 - 2003, like teacher training to improve quality of instruction, text books, basic supplies etc, instead of the brick and mortar.  Admittedly, the latter is more visible and thus scores higher propaganda points that teacher training.  Therefore, the military junta went for building schools all over the map with total disregard for the school mapping exercise that would have delineated the areas that needed facilities the most.  The end results is that most schools were either under-used and/or lacked basic items, like school forms, desks and school materials and supplies.  It is fairly common for teachers in these schools to bring along basic supplies financed personally.

The A(F)PRC failed in the field of education where they should have succeeded because, if for nothing else, the Gambian youth supported the coup d'etat and thus an important constituent of the so-called July 22 Revolution.  One of the reasons of the coup advanced by the regime was that the Jawara regime reserved all scholarship slots for sons and daughters of Ministers and  PPP militants, and for that reason, the coup was justified.  Of course, Gambians now know better.

Education was the low hanging fruit, and even here the regime managed to mishandle and mismanaged the opportunity.  As regards fiscal and monetary policy, the regime relied, initially, on Jawara's hold-over both at the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank for advise and guidance.  However, with time, Jammeh convinced himself that he's acquired sufficient working knowledge of monetary policy to go it alone.  The meddling started, first by fiddling with our external accounts which forced them to start cooking the books.  They proved their incompetence in these areas to which led to their discovery and eventual sanctions by the IMF. The regime was forced to refund monies advanced by the Fund and the suspension of disbursements. The regime started tampering with the floating exchange rate which served Gambia well since 1986 which sent shock waves across the local forex market leading to decline in confidence and the withholding of foreign exchange from the market by local players.

The A(F)PRC's spectacular incompetence in economic affairs was surpassed only by its management of dissent.  Under Sir Dawda Jawara, Gambia was the bastion of free democratic expression of thought and ideas.  There were no security agencies, like the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), that was dedicated exclusively to the repression of the opposition, both real and imaginary.  The National Security Service (NSS) was it was known then, was primarily an agency that collected and monitored intelligence primarily for national security purposes and not to use the agency as a tool of repression and to stifle, gag and imprison political opponents as is the case under the current dictatorship.

Under Jammeh, human rights abuses became the norm, and torture the weapon of choice, of a regime that lacked the competence and the desire to provide a set of policy choices to those offered by the opposition. What was lacking in intellectual capacity and power of persuasion, they made up in pure and brute force. The level of brutality meted out to Gambian by the regime is comparable to the violence the North Koreans face in the hands of their brutal and secretive regime.  Just like the Kim Jung Un's regime, the Jammeh regime resort to torture, murder, extrajudicial executions, forced imprisonment, forced exile and disappearances of those who dare oppose the regime or those who the regime regard as a threat to their continued iron-fist rule.

Therefore, after 20 years of repression and the absence of the rule of law, the Gambia has nothing to celebrate but to work towards riding this scourge from The Gambia.  The A(F)PRC regime must go so that Gambians can start the long road to reconstructing a damaged economy and an equally damaged national character.  The Gambia Jammeh inherited from Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara is a far cry from the Gambia Jammeh will leave behind - a very sad story that is unworthy of celebration.  In 20 years, Jammeh has made The Gambia poorer (both materially and morally), more corrupt, less productive by working less and engaging in leisure more, more violent and less respected around the globe.  In short, the last 20 years has been a pure unadulterated hell for Gambians, a suffering that must end.      

Jammeh is in Paris, gravely ill - UPDATE

The Gambian dictator departed Banjul on Monday, 20th January for medical treatment in Paris.  He departed by special flight a couple of days after celebrating what he claimed to be marking the 7th year of his discovery of the HIV/AIDS cure.

All four of his private jets are still parked at Banjul International Airport. It is now evident that he used both the celebrations and preferring the use of use of private charter instead of his private jet as decoys.                                                

This is a developing story.

UPDATE:  Jammeh left Banjul last weekend for Paris on chartered flight.  He returned Friday night/Saturday morning, according to a very reliable source.  What type of medical attention he received, and the specific ailment he's suffering from, is something we are not privy to.  

Why EU plan to boost aid to Gambia not a bad idea

Please, before you start hurling rocks, allow me to explain why I think boosting aid for The Gambia during the Article 8 dialogues between the European Union and The Gambia is not a bad idea, despite the serious human rights issues and serious corruption posed by the current regime.

According to reports, the EU is posed to double aid to The Gambia to € 150 million over the next seven years from the last EDF Article 8 dialogues figure of € 75 million.  At the concessionary windows of the World Bank and African Development Bank Group, there are similar talks that take place which they refer to as Replenishment negotiations with eligible Member States, with one significant difference - the EDF is replenished every seven years while the other institutions are for a shorter duration i.e. three years for both IDA and ADF.  Moving resources or reallocation them can be very difficult once the negotiations have been concluded, and the Agreement takes effect.  In the case of the EDF, you may have to wait for another seven years before you can receive any budget enhancement of significance.

The second point of note is that Article 8 is a significant departure from the old Cotonou Agreement that tended to provide relatively narrow set of issues bordering on political conditionalities.  The meetings where highly formal then, involving only Finance Ministers and high level officials - a setting that left little scope for frank and open discussion.  The Article 8 of today is different which seeks to broaden the level of participation to include civil society groups, and the scope of issues to discuss.  Of equal importance is that its is a process that lends itself to periodic assessment and evaluation, leading to further consultations on human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law which is commonly referred to as the 'essential elements' of the partnership between the EU and the ACP countries.

Lost in all of this, i.e. the planned increase in aid for The Gambia, is the assurance given by the EU Development Commissioner that "(F)or the next two years, the EU intends to allocate a limited envelop of up to € 25 million to support the Article 8 negotiations."  The threat to block funding for The Gambia has raised what has been described as "considerable tension" within the EU membership.

A community as diverse as the EU, such tensions and disagreements are frequent given that national priorities and interests may, and do, differ.  It is reported that Spain and Italy are reluctant to cut aid because they are two - one might want to add Portugal to the list - of the countries more affected by economic immigrants from Africa. The thinking in Spain and Italy is that if aid is denied, it will increase poverty, thus driving more of the immigrants to their countries.  This fear - founded or unfounded - has driven Spain, and perhaps other countries, to enter into bilateral agreement that will allow the repatriation of illegal immigrants from The Gambia back to Banjul.

This, of course, raises the question of whether it is appropriate to use aid as instrument to punish governments like the one in Banjul.  The fear is, of course, when you deny aid, the intended beneficiaries (women, children, rural population and the like) may end up the victims.  Targeting them for assistance, including the channeling of funds through NGOs and local civil groups are frequent methods of getting around direct support to the government.  Some of these methods are being used currently by the EU in The Gambia, and there's are no indications that these will stop.

On the whole, increasing the aid envelop for The Gambia, subject to the current periodic review to ensure that the concerns of civic society groups, human rights advocates and ordinary Gambians are met, is not a bad way to go.  I think what the EU is saying, in so many words, to Gambians is that in the event there's a change in government, and the manner of the change is endorsed by the international community, the funds will be there for the new government.   OK, the missiles can now fly.